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Identification of voting systems for the identification of preferences in public 
participation. Case Study: application of the Borda Count system for collective 
decision making at the Salonga National Park in the Democratic Republic of 
Congo.  
 
Abstract:The aim of this paper is to review the literature on voting systems based on 
Condorcet and Borda. We compared and classified them. Also we referred to some 
strengths and weaknesses of voting systems and finally in a case study, we made use of 
the Borda voting system for collective decision making in the Salonga National Park in 
the Democratic Republic of Congo. 
Keywords: Voting systems; Comparison; Classification; strengths and weaknesses of 
voting systems; Salonga National Park. 
 
1. Introduction 
 
The identification of preferences within a public participation process seems to have 
originated in the voting system procedures proposed by Ramón Llull in the 13th century. 
To this end, a general method or ‘Ars generalis’ was developed at the end of the 13th 
century, based on binary combinations of a series of principles or simple basic 
categories. Said procedures establish a voting system based on binary comparisons of 
candidates, and therefore the winner is the candidate that wins by majority due to the 
greatest number of comparisons.  
One of the main contributions of Ramón Llull’s concepts has been the appearance of the 
governance of the majority as a new general principle for legally binding collective 
decision making instead of the traditional requirement of unanimity (Colomer J.M., 
2013)1 
Nevertheless, to ascertain that the two essential requirements for any decision, the 
probability of consecution of a decision and the correctness of the decision, the 
following is needed:  
1. In the case of decisions on complex matters, to guarantee that the simple 
propositions they are made of are rigorously developed, and that the possible 
opinion is well presented and takes into account the proposal of each voter.  
2. The voter is required to be informed so as not to make a mistaken decision 
(Condorcet, M., 1794, Borda, J.C., 1799)2,3. 
 
18th century Europe is known as the Century of Lights or Enlightenment, a time in 
which the dominant thinkers began questioning the traditional forms of authority and 
power, as well as the moral rules supporting those traditions. One of the most important 
and lasting contributions of that time was the idea that the existence of a government 
has to be based on the protection and support of the immutable, natural rights of the 
citizens. Among these rights is the right to self-government, autonomy of thought and 
equality. The inherent virtue of these ideas forced many European countries to renounce 
to their aristocratic systems. The natural rights expounded in that time are immutable, 
which means they are not rights granted by the government but inherent to mankind. 
Although modern democratic governments make great efforts to achieve the ideals of 
that time, they can serve citizens better making use of the technological progress of the 
information era to increase citizen participation. 
Modern nations have the obligation of improving their systems so as to better guarantee 
respect of the rights of mankind. Engraved in his Memorial, this was Thomas 
Jefferson’s (1743-1826) declaration together with another thinker of the time: “[…] 
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Institutions must go hand in hand with the progress of the human mind. As it becomes 
more developed, more enlightened, […], institutions must advance also to keep pace 
with the times”. 
To continue making progress in this direction, the principle of citizen representation, 
articulated by Thomas Paine (Englishman: 1737-1809) and the principle of competitive 
actors for the common good as articulated by Adam Smith (Scotland: 1723-1790) are 
hereby regarded from the perspective of collective decision-making systems. On the 
other hand, these principles can be understood as being part of the requirements for 
optimal decision making, framed in the mathematical statements of the Marquee of 
Condorcet (Frechman: 1743-1794). (Rodriguez, M.A., 2009)4. 
With regards to Collective Decision-Making Systems (CDMS), currently research is 
being carried out in these areas:  
Voting systems, prediction markets, information dissemination and recommendation 
systems.  
• Voting systems  
 
What does “real” democracy look like? In the CDMS, new governance models 
are studied. With the right tools, it could be possible to one day achieve a more 
adaptivelarge-scale decision making process for society.  
 
• Prediction markets 
 
What does the future hold in store? If all the fragments of information contained 
within a collective entity are aggregated correctly, may the future be known? 
What does this say about the nature of determinism? And yet more importantly, 
can money be made with CDMS?  
 
• Information dissemination 
 
How are ideas disseminated across a population? CDMS develop tools to ease 
dissemination of information throughout great collectives. Here, the actions of 
individuals integrated in a social network provide the means for dissemination of 
the contextualized information.  
 
• Recommendation System 
 
Can a collectively generated network of heterogenic objects be used as the 
substratum for the quest for solutions for the problems of an individual? CDMSs 
explore the role of semantic networks and the future of the resolution of 
collective problems in a variety of environments5. 
 
To conclude this introduction, it is worth highlighting the importance the identification 
of the preferences of individuals has in collective decisions in a public participation 
process. Research on this subject was carried out driven by the interest of knowing the 
different methodologies that exist to identify the preferences of individuals as well as, 
on the other hand, establishing comparison and classification of the different 
methodologies to this purpose. Likewise, we are interested conducting research on the 
subject of identifying preferences for collective decisions.  
In the context of identification of methodologies for the identification of preferences, 
the present research was carried out with a series of scientific publications (with a 
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gathering of bibliographical information) where the main ideas stated by each author on 
the subject have been summarized.  
 
In the first section, we shall take a look at the voting systems used for collective 
decision making. A compilation of different preference identification methodologies for 
the voting systems shall be defined and said systems shall thus be classified. 
 
In the second section, we shall perform a comparison of the different voting systems. 
Voting systems based on the Condorcet procedure shall be compared with positional 
voting systems or Borda based systems.  
 
In the third section, reference shall be made to some strengths and weaknesses of the 
voting systems. 
 
In the fourth section, we shall provide a potential contribution of this work. This is a 
study case in which the Borda voting system shall be applied to the Salonga National 
Park in the Democratic Republic of Congo for collective decision making to select a 
management model. This shall be followed by a section of conclusions.  
 
2. Work Methodology 
 
We shall look for information regarding the collective decision making systems in 
scientific articles, books and internet upon which to base the investigation. The 
documental sources of the original articles (primary sources) have been taken into 
account, as well as the secondary sources. The review of the study of articles has 
enabled us to conceptually define the terms of our search and has likewise enabled us to 
have the elements for the conclusion.  
 
3. Voting Systems 
In this section, we have compiled different methodologies to identify preferences for the 
voting systems. The aim is to provide the key or main ideas of each enumerated 
methodology.  
 
The precursory work of Ramon Llull 
Llull proposed a system of exhaustive binary comparisons that is more efficient to know 
the winner in the Condorcet procedure. Llull wrote at least three works on voting and 
elections:  
• Artifitium electionis personarum (c.1274-1283) (the method for electing people) 
(AEP) 
• En cual manera Natana fo electa a abadessa (c. 1283) (How was Natana  
elected as abbess) (B24) 
• De arte electionis (In the method for elections) (1299) (DAE).  
 
In AEP, Llull presents his initial proposal for voting in academic form and introduces a 
graphic representation of the binary comparisons of the candidates. B24 is chapter 24 of 
Blanquerna, originally written in Catalan and regarded as one of the first novels written 
in a Romance language, where the election of the abbess of a convent is used as an 
occasion for dissemination.  
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Llull’s proposal was the first serious attempt at creating a system capable of putting in 
practice the majority principle in real elections. Therefore, his work is considered as 
being foundational and precursory.  
According to the Llull voting system, the election shall be held through the holding of 
several rounds of majority voting among all possible candidate pairs. For n candidates, 
this requires n (n-1)/2 comparisons. The winner is the majority candidate in the greatest 
number of binary comparisons (Colomber JM, 2013).  
Later on, the most two most popular families of voting norms are the Condorcet 
methods, which elect the winner when there is one, and the Borda scoring methods, 
which assign points to each candidate according to a ordering of the candidates 
(Moulin, 88)6. 
 
3.1 Definition of voting systems  
 
Condorcet Methodology 
 
The Condorcet method is a voting system that serves to elect a person among a group 
of candidates. Voters order candidates from greater to lesser level of preference.  
 
• Order the candidates by order of preference. Draws are allowed, that is, to give 
the same preference to two candidates if no special interest is invested for any 
of them.  
• Compare each candidate in the voting slip with each one of the rest. The one 
with the greatest preference scores a point.  
• Add up the victories of each candidate. The candidate that has beaten each 
candidate more times than the times they have lost is the preferred one and wins 
the election. 
• In case of a draw, use one of the methods described further down (Young, H.P., 
1988)7. 
 
Borda Methodology 
 
Each voter states their preferences as per the ranking of candidatesp from top to bottom. 
A candidate does not receive any points for being in the last place, a point for being in 
the second to last position, and so on up to p-1pointsfor being in first place. The 
candidate with the highest total scoring is the Borda winner.  
 
In other words, voters score all candidates from highest to lowest according to their 
preferences and the candidates with the highest overall score wins.  
Let’s consider a finite set of alternatives (or candidates) X = {x1, x2, x3……,xn}, with 
n≥3. We could say that P is a relationship of preference over X if P is an asymmetric 
binary relationship, that is: if xi P xp,, then xj P xi, cannot happen. The relationship of 
indifference I associated to a P preference relationship picks up the absence of 
preference:  xi I xj, means that neither xi P xj, nor xj P xi. The weak relationship, finally, 
P U I includes both the preference as well as the indifference: xi (P U I) xj means that xi 
P xj, or xi I xj. Given Pk as the agent relationship preference k (k = 1, 2,……., m) 
regarding the set of n alternatives for X. Such a relationship of preference can be 
associated to the following matrix:  
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Where: rkij=1if xi P xj, and rkij=0, in the other case.  
The Borda Aproach: individual Borda scores assigned by agent k regarding alternative 
xi, that are given by:  
rk (xi)=ΣnΩ  rkij=Σnj=1 rkij with Ω equivalent to (j=1, xiPkxj). 
This individual counter reflects Borda’s idea that to each xi alternative, the agent k 
assigns as scoring the number of alternatives that for him are the worst. Another 
alternative for this value is the summing up of the coefficients of the i-esimal row of the 
individual preferences matrix. It is worth stating that the possible range of values is 
between the set {0, 1, 2,…… n-1}. That some superior values are reached or not 
depends on the absence or presence of indifference between the different alternatives, 
respectively. With these individual scores, on each individual alternative, a collective 
can be defined as follows:  
r(xi)=Σmk=1 rk (xi), using the Borda method, the alternative(s) with the highest score 
are/is the winner(s) (Panero M.M, 2006)8. 
Below we have included an example of the two most popular voting systems, the 
Condorcet and the Borda families. Daugherty (2004)9 illustrates how these two 
methods are different. Let us say that we ask voters to classify three candidates A, B and 
C. To represent A defeats B, we will write A>B. Let us suppose that 18 voters choose 
according to the following classifications:  
 
Table 1: Preference Classification (Source: Duagherty, 2004) 
 
Votes Classification 
2 A>B>C 
5 A>C>B 
2 B>A>C 
4 B>C>A 
1 C>A>B 
4 C>B>A 
 
Therefore, we could compile these data in a profile, p, representing the number of 
people voting for each candidate classification. The profile for this result, if we order 
the classification alphabetically, is p = (2, 5, 2, 4, 1, 4). If we use the Borda 
methodology, the result of these votes would give 10.5; 9 and 8.5 points to A, B, and C, 
respectively, giving a general classification of A>B>C. However, if we choose to 
calculate the classification (ranking) by pairs (Condorcet methodology), we find the 
following count:  
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Table 2: Candidate Scoring (Source: Daugherty, 2004) 
 
Score Pair 
8 A>B 
8 A>C 
8 B>C 
10 B>A 
10 C>A 
10 C>B 
 
This gives a transitive classification of C>B>A. We hereby state that these two 
calculation methods are totally contradictory between themselves in this case. This is 
what is known as a paradox, as the different results were calculated using two 
apparently fair calculation methodologies.  
 
The Copeland Method 
 
This methodology compares candidate a with any other candidate x. They shall score +1 
if the majority prefers a over x, -1 if the majority prefers x over a, and 0 if the result is a 
draw. Summarizing the results of a over all the different x candidates, we obtain the 
score for a. A candidate with the highest score, called the Copeland winner, is chosen 
(Faliszewski, P et al, 2008)10. 
 
Paired Comparison Methodologies 
 
Given A as a finite set of “alternatives” (for example, candidates) and V a finite set of 
individuals (for example, voters), individuals can express their opinions collectively by 
establishing a classified list from “most preferred” to “least preferred” through some 
voting mechanism choosing some or all the alternatives in A.  
 
Paired comparison methods are schemas designed to establish a classification (or partial 
classification) of the elements of a set, A, based on the comparisons amongst the 
elements in some (or all) the pairs of elements in A. One of the most popular of these 
methods is owed to Zermelo (Anderson, L.B, 2009)11. 
 
Coombs Methodology 
 
The Coombs method is a voting system created by Clyde Coombs, used in elections to 
choose a single winner. Each voter classifies candidates by preference order (Grofman, 
B. and Feld, S.L. 2004)12. 
 
Slater Methodology 
 
Given a set of candidates, for each pair of candidates, a, b, such that a is in a higher 
ranking than b, but b defeats a in an election by pair, this seems to be a contradiction 
and an ordering is a Slater ranking if it minimizes this type of inconsistencies (Conitzer, 
V., 2006)13. 
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Simpson Methodology 
 
This method consists of a candidate a, and for all other candidates x, it calculates the 
number N (a ,x) of voters that prefer a to x. The Simpson score for a is the minimum of 
N (a, x) of voters that prefer a over x. The Simpson score for a is the minimum of N (a, 
x) over the other x candidates. The candidate with the highest score, called the Simpson 
winner, is chosen (Levin, j. and Nalebuff, B., 1995)14. 
 
Kemeny Methodology 
 
The Kemeny voting system stands out because it is the only voting system that is 
neutral, coherent, and applies the Condorcet theorem. A voting scheme is defined in 
which the election of winning candidates is based on the classification according to the 
electoral preference. In the case of two candidates, it is not trivial to say what the correct 
manner of assessing the classification of voters is. As an example of the difficulties 
produced, we can observe the Condorcet paradox that goes back to 1785: let us suppose 
that there are 3n voters with a preferential classification of a>b>c, b>c>a and c>a>b, 
for n electors. If we assess the classification by the majority rule, then we have a 
cyclical aggregate order of preference: a defeats b, b defeats c, c defeats a.  
 
Now, the Kemeny system is a preferential voting system. Each voter issues their vote 
via a classification of all the candidates by order of preference. Draws are allowed. For 
example, a voter can classify candidates a, b, c, d and e by order of preference a>b = 
c>d>e. The candidate a is the favorite, and e is the candidate with less favoritism in the 
classification. Candidates b and c are considered of equal convenience, that is to say, 
they are linked. A classification of preferences without draw is called a strict order of 
preference. Each voter identifies with their preference order, and the set of voters is 
regarded as a set of multiple preference classifications.  
Kemeny defined the result of an election as a collection of lists of preferences that is 
“closer” to the list of preferences of voters. Such an order of preference is called a 
Kemeny Consensus. A candidate is the winner of the elections if they are a preferred 
candidate in a Kemeny Consensus.  
There are different manners of defining proximity. For Kemeny elections, the objective 
is to reduce the Kemeny punctuation to the minimum: the sum of the distances to the 
lists of preferences of the voters. For each pair P, Q of classifications of preference, the 
distance is defined as:  
 
dist (P,Q) = Σ{c, d}dP,Q(c,d),where the sum of all the non-ordered pairs are taken {c, d} for 
the candidates and,  
dP,Q(c,d) =0 if P and Q agree in c and d.  
dP,Q(c,d) = 1 if P or Q have a preference between c and d and the other does not, 
dP,Q(c,d) = 2 if P and Q agree strictly between c and d.  
Given a set of candidates C, and a multiple set of preference classifications V over C, 
the following 3 functions are defined for the Kemeny scoring:  
 
• For each P over C order of preference:  
 
Kemeny_Score (C,V,P) = ΣQ∈V dist (P, Q). 
 
For candidate c ∈ C,  
 12 
 
 
Kemeny_Score: (C,V,c) = min {Kemeny_Score (C,V,P) |P is an order of preference in 
C, and c is a candidate preferred in P.  
• Kemeny_Score (C,V,P) |P is a preference order in C (Hemaspaandra E. et al, 
2005)15. 
 
 
Dodgson Methodology 
 
In the Dodgson Methodology, each voter presents an ordered list of all the candidates, 
as a function of their own preference (from best to worst).  
The election is won by the candidate (s) that is (n) “closer” to being the winner of 
Condorcet: that each candidate is assigned a score that is the number if exchange of 
adjacent preferences in the order of preferences of voters to make the candidate be the 
Condorcet winner regarding the resulting preference orders (Hemaspaandra, E, et al. 
1997)16. 
 
Young Methodology 
 
The principle of the Young voting rule is similar to Dodgson’s but in this case the 
scoring of a candidate x is the lower number of voters whose elimination makes x the 
Condorcet winner (Rothe, J. et al., 2003)17.  
 
Banks Methodology 
 
A Banks winner for the collection of P profiles is the higher vertex of any sub-trophy 
for graph Mp (Banks, J.S. 1985)18. 
 
Methodology of the Approval Vote (approval voting) 
 
The approval voting is a voting method in which voters may vote for all candidates as 
they wish in an election. They are normally used in elections with a single winner, it 
may however extender to elections with multiple winners. The approval vote is a 
primitive form of valuation vote, in which a somewhat more complex valuation is 
allowed for candidates (for example, scoring them). However, in the approval vote, only 
“acceptance” or “non-acceptance” is allowed (Brahms J.S. and Fishburn, P.C., 1978)19. 
 
Negative Vote Methodology (negative voting) 
 
This is a voting system proposed by Boehm. Under the negative vote, each elector is 
allowed to vote for a candidate. This vote can be favorable or against the candidate. A 
vote in favor adds to the score of the candidate and a negative vote subtracts a point 
from the candidate scoring. The result of the negative voting in the voting system is the 
subset of candidates with greatest total net voting (the sum of points in favor and 
against), which can be negative (Brahms, J.S. and Fishburn, P.C., 1978)19. 
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Uninominal majority Scrutiny Methodology (plural voting system) 
 
This is a voting system in which the candidate can only vote for a single candidate and 
the winner of the election is the candidate receiving the greatest number of votes. This 
concept is also known as the relative majority or plurality concept20. 
 
Second electoral round Methodology (Ballotage) 
 
The second electoral round (Ballotage or balotaje in Spanish) is the term used to 
designate the second round of voting in elections for executive or legislative positions. 
The word Balotaje comes from the verb Balloter, which means voting with ballotets, 
balls (ballots). Balotaje means the election with a second round. In the ample sense, it 
means that for accessing the corresponding public office, half of the issued votes are 
needed (Messner M., and Polborn, M. 2005)21. 
 
Schultze Methodology 
 
The Schulze method is a voting system developed in 1997 by Markus Schulze that 
selects a winner according to the voters’ preference. This method can also be used to 
create a list of winners. 
 
The Schultze Methodology consists of:  
 
1. Finding out the Schwartz set (the lowest set of candidates that is not won by 
anyone outside the set). If there is only one candidate in the set, this is the 
Condorcet winner. If there are several members but no defeats among them, 
there is a normal draw amongst them.  
2. In any other case, eliminate the softest defeat in the Schwartz set (that is, won by 
the smallest margin). Recalculate the new Schwartz set and repeat the process 
(Schulze, M., 2003)22. 
 
“Unrestricted pointing-voting scheme” Methodology. 
 
This scoring rule is flexible and assigns voters an equal number of scoring and does not 
impose any limitation on the assignment of the initial amount of scores amongst 
candidates (Nitzan, S. 1985)23. 
 
Cumulative Voting Methodology 
 
This is a methodology in which n voters assign k points to the candidates and that is 
used in a election quota (qo= (nk+1)/ (k+1).Any candidate obtaining at least q votes is 
chosen (Bolger, E.M., 1985)24. 
 
Transferable single Vote Methodology (Single Transferable Vote) 
 
It is a system in which a vote is initially assigned to the voter’s favorite candidate, and if 
the candidate has already been elected or eliminated, all the surplus votes are transferred 
according to the voter’s preferences. The candidate that has obtained the quota 
 q = [n /(k+1]+1, where n represents the issued votes and k the positions to fill, is the 
winner (Levin, J. and Nalebuff, B., 1995).14 
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Additional Members System Methodology (“adjusted district voting”) 
 
This is a system in which people vote separately for the candidate and the party of their 
preference. Additional chairs are assigned to the party if the number of circumscriptions 
winning does not reflect their total participation in the total of the votes (Brams, S.J. and 
Fishburn, P.C., 1991)25. 
 
“Reducing to the minimum the representation imbalance” (“Minimizing the 
representational imbalance) Methodology 
 
This is a system proposed by Monroe (1995)26. The idea is to assign approximately the 
same number of electors to each candidate to reduce the imbalance of representation in 
an election.  
 
Black Methodology 
 
This is a voting procedure that elects the Condorcet winner (if there were any); if this 
were not the case, the Borda winner is appointed (Black, D. 1948)27. 
 
Nanson and Baldwin Methodology 
 
It is a voting procedure that iterates the alternatives to reach the mean Borda scoring. At 
the end of the process of iteration, one alternative is left or a group of alternatives with a 
draw, and a winner is selected if Condorcet exists (Narodystka, N., 2011)28. 
 
3.2 Voting Systems Classification 
 
We could establish a general classification of the different voting systems in the 
following way:  
The two voting super classes are the Condorcet and the Borda method. 
  
A. The “Condorcet Winner” Class 
 
The first two super classes for voting that follow are susceptible of producing a 
Condorcet winner: the Copeland Fishburn method, the Nanson Method, the Condorcet 
Method, the Black method, the Kemeny Method, the Dodgson Method, the Young 
Method, the Schwartz Method, the Miller Method, the Banks Method and the Slater 
method. 
 
B. The “positional scoring procedures” class 
 
These are systems that serve to produce a winner granting scorings to different 
candidates. Within this class, are the Borda Methodology, the plural voting system and 
the “unrestricted point-voting scheme”  
 
C. The “Hybrid Voting System”  
 
We could group some voting systems in a class called “hybrid voting system”. Panero 
(2006)8 states that this reconciles the Codorcet principle (non-positional focus) with the 
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Borda rule (positional focus). For example, the Nanson and Baldwin, Black and 
Kemeny voting system are hybrid systems.  
 
D “Score distribution Procedures” Class 
 
All the voting procedures previously described use both an unclassified voting system 
(for example: Condorcet methodology) or a classified system (Borda methodology). 
These systems do not allow voters to express their preference intensities in a more 
complete manner. The distribution procedures accommodate the possibility requesting 
each voter the distribution of a specified number of points among the candidates in any 
form that they wish. The candidates with the highest points are the winners. The usual 
term for this procedure is the cumulative vote. The elector has the possibility of giving 
different votes to a single candidate and this serves to foster the minority representation.  
 
E. “Proportional Representation” Class 
 
The proportional representation system is an electoral system in which the percentage of 
votes received by the political parties determines the number of seats that are assigned 
in legislative assemblies or parliaments.  
The different systems of proportional representation are:  
• Single transferable vote. This is a voting system based on proportional 
representation 
• Additional members vote (Adjusted District Voting) 
• The methodology of reducing to the minimum the representation imbalance 
(“Minimizing representational imbalance”).  
 
F. “Unclassified voting Procedures” Class (non-ranked voting procedures).  
 
Within the unclassified voting systems we can also find the approval voting, and the 
negative voting. 
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Table 3 summarizes the different classes. (Source: own elaboration) 
 
“Condorcet 
Winner” 
Class 
“Positional 
scoring 
procedures” 
class 
“Hybrid 
voting 
systems” 
class 
“Score 
distribution 
procedures” 
class 
“Proportional 
representation” 
class 
Non-
classified 
voting 
procedures 
Copeland 
method 
Borda 
Methodology 
Black 
Method 
Cumulative 
Vote 
Single 
transferable 
vote 
Approval 
vote 
Fishburn 
Method 
Plural voting 
system 
Nanson 
and 
Baldwin 
method 
 Additional 
members 
voting 
Negative 
vote 
Nanson 
Method 
Unrestricted 
point-voting 
scheme 
Kemeny 
Method 
 Representation 
imbalance 
reduction to 
the minimum 
 
Condorcet 
Method 
     
Black 
Method 
     
Kemeny 
Method 
     
Dodgson 
Method 
     
Young 
Method 
     
Schwartz 
Method 
     
Miller 
Method 
     
Banks 
Method 
     
Slater 
Method 
     
 
4. Comparison among the voting systems 
 
This section, after having identified some voting systems, helps us focus on the 
comparison among different identified voting methodologies. The two most popular 
families of voting systems are the Condorcet method, that selects Condorcet winners 
when there are none, and the Borda scoring methods, that assign points to each 
candidate according to their classification as per the opinion of voters (Moulin, H. 
1988).  
As main properties (or criteria) for the voting systems, supposedly the voting systems 
must have 3 of the following basic properties (Martin, W.E. et al, 1996)29: 
 
1. A Pareto Optimal (Pareto Condition). If candidate a is preferred by unanimity 
over candidate b, then candidate b cannot be elected.  
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2. Anonymity. The names of voters do not matter: if two voters exchange their 
votes, the result of the election shall remain unchanged.  
3. Neutrality: the names of the candidates have no relevance: if candidates a andb 
exchange in the order of all voters, then, in the results of the elections, a must be 
substituted by b and vice versa. Nevertheless, the following must be taken into 
account:  
• Monotony: If a wins the elections with a preference profile, then he or 
she shall continue being the winner in any other profile obtained from 
the original one via an improvement of the classification of a in the 
opinion of the voters, without affecting the relative classifications of the 
other candidates.  
• Reinforcement: Let us suppose that two disconnected groups of voters 
face the same list of candidates and both select a. Then, if two groups 
vote together, they should still vote for a.  
• Participation: Let us suppose that a group of voters select a. If this group 
increases by and additional voter, then the new electoral mass must 
select a or a candidate that the new voter prefers strictly to a.  
There are two other questions related with voting that must be taken into 
account, that is, the possibility that the voters may benefit from distorting 
their preferences (instead of voting for their favorite candidate a, a voter 
supports the second option b preferred by c, acknowledging that a has no 
possibility of winning) and that the result of the elections may be 
manipulated by voter coalitions.  
• “Strategy-proofness” A voting rule that is a “test strategy” if every 
individual voter maximizes their utility reporting their opinion. 
 
• Nucleus stability: A voting rule is the stable nucleus if there is no 
winning coalition that can find a voting strategy that could increase the 
utility of each member of the coalition. A winning coalition is the set of 
voters that can force an election of a candidate regardless of what the rest 
of the voting population votes. 
• Homogeneity: If the electorate is divided into N voters, and each one of 
them has the same preferences of the original, it would be difficult to 
imagine why the set of the election should change (Fishburn,P.C., 
1977)30. 
• The Smith Condorcet Principle. In voting systems, the Smith set is the 
smallest non-void set of candidates so that each member defeats any 
other member out of the set in an election by pairs of candidates.  
• Condorcet transitivity: If you consider y as a viable candidate for the 
single final election and if x has the simple majority over y, then x also 
must be considered as a viable candidate for the final election.  
• Consistency. If p(p1….pr) and q(q1…..qs) are preference profiles, then 
(p,q) denotes the profile (p1……..,pr,q1……qs). Therefore (p,q) may be seen 
as a profile obtained for the set of two unconnected voting bodies.  
• Discriminability: The capacity of a voting system of producing only one 
winner.  
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4.1. Condorcet based Voting System 
 
A series of voting procedures has been proposed whose goal is to elect a strict 
Condorcet candidate when there is one. A Condorcet voting procedure is said to be 
one when there is a strict Condorcet Candidate. A dozen Condorcet methodologies, 
procedures or voting procedures have been defined (Brams, S.J., and Fishburn, P.C., 
1977, 2002)31. 
 
Table 4: Comparison of some voting systems using the Condorcet Procedure 
(Source: own elaboration) 
 
 A B C D E F G H I J K L 
Copeland 
Method 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Low No No No No No Yes 
Fishburn 
method 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Low No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Nanson 
Method 
Yes Yes Yes No Yes High No No Yes No No Yes 
Condorcet 
Method 
Yes Yes Yes Yes No High No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Black 
Method 
Yes Yes Yes Yes No High No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Kemeny 
Method 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes High No No Yes No No Yes 
Dodgson 
Method 
Yes Yes Yes No No High No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Young 
Method 
Yes Yes Yes Yes No High No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Schwartz 
Method 
Yes Yes No Yes Yes Low Yes Yes Yes No No Yes 
 
A: anonymous; B: Neutrality; C: Pareto Condition; D: Monotony; E: “Condorcet 
principle” of Smith; F: discriminability; G: consistency, H: Condorcet Transitivity; 
I: Inclusive Condorcet Principle; J: Condorcet Exclusion Principle; K: Strict 
Condorcet Principle; L: Homogeneity.  
For further details on the Miller, Slater and Banks procedures (refer to Hudry, O, 
2009, and Miller, 1980)32,33. 
 
4.2. Borda based voting Systems  
 
Score positional procedures include the Borda Method and those in which differences 
among scores given to candidates in successive positions in the ballot of voters are not 
the same.  
Within the voting systems using the scoring system we find the Borda methodology, the 
plural voting system, and the “unrestricted point-voting scheme”. The “unrestricted 
point-voting” methodology and the Borda Methodology have been described in section 
1. The plural voting system is characterized by assigning 3 points to a candidate 
occupying the first place, 1 point to the candidate in second place and 0 points to the 
last place. Therefore, the points granted to candidates would be s = (3,1,0….0). In the 
table, we can observe some properties of positional voting systems.  
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Table 5: Comparison between positional voting systems (Source: own elaboration) 
 
 Anonymity Neutrality Monotony Consistency Manipulation 
Borda 
Methodology 
yes yes yes yes no 
Plural voting 
system 
yes yes yes yes yes 
“unrestricted 
point-voting 
scheme” 
yes yes yes yes yes 
 
All positional voting systems are susceptible of manipulation except the Borda voting 
system, which is less susceptible to manipulation (Saari, D.G. 1990)34. 
 
5. Some strengths and weaknesses of the voting systems 
 
Some voting procedures may be controlled by the authorities in charge of the election 
process to achieve strategic results. For example, it could be possible to influence the 
result of an election through the specification of the sequence in which the alternatives 
are to be taken into account, or through the specification of the composition of the sub-
committees that nominate candidates.  
Bartholdi, J.J. et al (1992)35 have studied how influence could or could not be exerted 
on the results of an election. This would represent the weaknesses or strengths of the 
voting system. They centered on the plural voting system and the Condorcet voting 
system. 
The plural voting system selects the winner as the candidate with the most votes over 
the rest of the candidates. By the Condorcet system, we refer to any procedure that 
always selects the candidate that would defeat any other in even condition elections.  
It is said that a voting system is immune to control if it is not possible to change a “non-
winner” candidate to “single winner” via manipulation of the voting procedure. If not, 
the system is susceptible to control. For such a system therefore, we can say that it is 
vulnerable. If not, then the system is resistant to control. The types of control can imply 
addition, elimination or partition of the set of candidates or of the total of voters.  
Voter Participation 
Let C be the universe of candidates. Let us consider the possibility of an election that is 
in two stages, based on the participation of the candidates in the C1 and C2 subsets. C1 U 
C2 = C and C1 ∩C2 = 0. In the first place, all the electoral force votes for the candidates 
from C1; then, the winner of this election must face the candidates from C2. Could this 
happen in elections by partition of C1 and C2? 
In general, the plural voting system resists control of candidates, while the Condorcet 
system resists control of voters.  
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Table 6: Strengths and Weaknesses of the plural voting system and of the 
Condorcet voting system (Source: Bartholdi, J.J. et al, 1992) 
 
 Candidate 
addition 
Voter 
Addition 
Candidate 
Elimination 
Voter 
Elimination 
Candidate 
Partition 
Voter 
Partition 
Plural 
Voting 
System 
resistant vulnerable resistant vulnerable resistant vulnerable 
Condorcet 
Voting 
System 
immune resistant vulnerable resistant vulnerable resistant 
 
6. Study Case: application of the Borda methodology for collective decision 
making at the Salonga National Park in the D.R. of Congo 
 
The objective of this second part is to review a group decision making process using the 
social election theory, specifically the Borda voting system. The elements of a social 
election problem are the voters, the alternatives, the preferences and the aggregation. 
As part of the approach on soil use management, the Forestry Service (NFMA: National 
Forest Management Act) has developed a system to support the decision in which 
participative decision making is an important component. To help reduce the possibility 
of conflicts to the minimum in the forestry planning process as there are so many 
competing uses for scarce resources, a model defining the voters that can take part and 
the election of alternative scenarios for development and conservation was developed. 
(Martin WE, 1996)36. 
According with the Borda methodology defined in section 1, we shall consider a set of 
alternatives A that would represent the different Salonga National Park management 
models. Voters or participants, P (P1……Pm), where m=7, would represent the different 
stakeholders involved in the management of Salonga National Park and said voters 
would score all the alternatives from higher to lower in accordance with their 
preferences and the alternative with the greatest overall score would prevail. 
Following, the study case focuses on Salonga National Park. We intend to apply the 
Borda voting system to select an alternative for management of the Park. The following 
system briefly describes the Park and the problems inherent to the aforementioned. The 
Democratic Republic of Congo has over 145 millions of hectares as forest space, that is, 
26% of the total rain forests in the world and over 52% of the forestry layer in Africa. It 
has a surface of 2,329,374 square kilometers, out of which over 60% is comprised of a 
forest cover. The country has 5 National Parks out of which 4 have been declared 
Endangered World Heritage Sites by UNESCO (early 1996). 
The Salonga National Park (1°00’-3°20’S, 20°-22°30’E) covers around 36,560 km2, 
located in an isolated area with the Congo River basin. It is the second greatest reserve 
of tropical rainforests in the world. The Salonga National Park is the habitat for many 
endemic species that in great numbers are in danger of extinction. The Park was 
declared National Park on November 30, 1970 by virtue of ordinance 70-318, in which 
was defined as “une reserve naturelle integrale” (integral natural reserve). 
This is the greatest dense rain forest area protected in the African Continent. Very 
isolated and only accessible via water transport, this park contains the important 
evolution of species and communities in the woodland area that is relatively intact. Also 
playing a key role in the regulation of the climate and the absorption of carbon 
emissions, it constitutes a habitat of a number of endangered species, such as the pygmy 
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chimpanzee (Bonobo), the rainforest elephant and the Congo Peacock. The Park 
represents one of the rare existing biotopes that are intact in Central Africa. 
 
Besides, it also has ample swamp areas and gallery forests that are practically 
inaccessible, that have never been explored and that still may be considered as virgin 
lands. Vegetal and animal life in the park constitutes an example of the biological 
evolution and the adaptation of forms of life in an environment of complex equatorial 
rain forests. The great size of the Park guarantees the possibility of an ongoing 
evolution of species and biotic communities within a relatively intact rainforest. 
 
In 1984, it became a part of the UNESCO World Heritage Site Catalogue. Due to a civil 
war in the eastern side of the country, it was also added, in 1999, to the list of 
Endangered World Heritage Sites, due to the retreat of populations such as white 
Rhinoceroses. 
The fact that the park is divided into two distinct sectors gives a great importance to the 
Monkoto Corridor in the biological processes of the two areas of the park. This zone, 
due to the anthropic pressure it has been subjected to during many years, as it is the 
most densely populated area near the park; it suffers the greatest degradation within this 
habitat. Even so, it works as a biological corridor of the two areas, with a fundamental 
role in the connectivity of the park. 
 
The National Park suffers great problems, out of which the following stand out: 
• Illegal hunting and commercial traffic of meat of wild animals; 
• The absence of a legal protective framework; 
• Conflicts between local populations, that produce fires, deforestation for crop 
growing, wood extraction for heating, honey harvesting and construction of 
boats, disputes over the park limits in certain areas and excavations in search of 
mineral resources (diamonds, etc).  
• Forestry exploitation in the southern part 
• Water pollution with toxic products used for illegal fishing. 
 
In 2006, a resolution of conflicts in the park was worked out, due to the growing 
hostility among local communities and the national authority in charge of managing 
Salonga National Park37, 38. In the city of Monkoto, there was a meeting of high 
authorities, in which the different parts managed to decrease tensions that had been 
created. The meeting also marked the first time that a provincial governor went to 
Monkoto in over 30 years. 
 
Given the multiple problems that the park is being subjected to, and its great value, 
both nationally and internationally, the use of the theory of Social Election via a 
Borda voting system would try to identify the options or alternatives that are viable 
for collective decision making for voters so as to draft a management model that 
eliminates or mitigates all the damage that is endangering its preservation. Despite 
the existence of a Park Coordination Committee (CoCoSi) and a state regulation 
currently in force (Code Forestier from 2002), which ensures the conservation of 
these habitats, their capacity of guaranteeing the future of the park is limited. 
 
In this case, the voters would be: 
P1: the forestry industry (private owned): the société de Développement Forestier 
(SODEFOR), the Société Forestière et des Matières Ligneuses Africaines 
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(SOFORMA), the Société Industrielle et Forestière du Congo (SIFORCO), the 
Compagnie Forestière of Transformation (CFT), the Forestière et Industrie of 
Transformation du Bois (ITB). 
P2:  environmental organizations such as World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF), 
Wildlife Conservation Society (WCS), Zoological Society of Milwaukee (ZSM), 
FAO, UNESCO, and the United Nations Foundation. 
P3: forest guards from the Salonga National Park. 
P4: mining companies (excavation and prospection of diamonds). 
P5: local communities such as the Kitawalistes, Yaemila, Batua, and the tribe 
leaders (an estimated 5,000 inhabitants around the park). 
P6: The local governmental entities such as the provincial government of Equateur, 
the Park Management Committee. 
P7: the national government of the D.R. of Congo represented by such institutions as 
Institut Congolais of the Conservation of Nature (ICCN), Institut National of 
Recherche Agraire (INRA). 
And the alternatives for participants to choose from would be: 
A1: To leave the park without a management plan (that is, fewer restrictions) 
A2: A plan to raise awareness for the resolution of conflicts of the local populations 
and the recovery of the forest. 
A3: The design of new economic activities for the local community, compatible with 
conservation. 
A4: The regulation and control of destructive activities (fishing, hunting and armed 
groups) in the park. 
A5: The regulation and control of mining exploitation activities affecting the forestry 
areas of the park. 
A6: The development of a system of environmental indicators. 
A7: The design of a specific norm in the park (use and management plan, with more 
restrictions). 
The profile of preference is defined in table 7. The participant must score from 1 to 
7 each alternative without being able to repeat the score. 
 
Table 7: Preference Profile representing the scores of participants (Own 
elaboration) 
 
 A1 A2 A3 A4 A5 A6 A7 
P1 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 
P2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
P3 1 3 2 6 4 7 5 
P4 2 6 7 3 1 5 4 
P5 6 7 5 2 4 3 1 
P6 1 5 4 7 2 3 6 
P7 1 7 6 3 5 2 4 
 
Although the scores are a simulation, a guideline of the behavior and the preferences 
expressed in previous occasions by participants has been followed. That is, 
historical data has been used, as well as NGOs, civil society, and environmental 
organizations. Applying the Borda rule, we obtain the following table: 
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Table 8: Application of the Borda rule to the preference profile table. (Own 
elaboration) 
 
 A1 A2 A3 A4 A5 A6 A7 
P1 6 5 4 3 2 1 0 
P2 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 
P3 0 2 1 5 3 6 4 
P4 1 5 6 2 0 4 3 
P5 5 6 4 1 3 2 0 
P6 0 4 3 6 1 2 5 
P7 0 6 5 2 4 1 3 
 
As may be seen in table 8, applying the Borda rule, the least preferred alternative 
receives the score  0 and so on up to the most preferred alternative 6 = (m- 1). 
 
Therefore, Borda scores for each alternative would be: 
 
A1=6+0+0+1+5+0+0=12 
A2=5+1+2+5+6+4+6=29 
A3=4+2+1+6+4+3+5=25 
A4=3+3+5+2+1+6+2=22 
A5=2+4+3+0+3+1+4=17 
A6=1+5+6+4+2+2+1=21 
A7=0+6+4+3+0+5+3=21 
 
The alternatives were enumerated from the alternative with fewer restrictions, A1, to 
the alternative with most restrictions, A7. It must be said that the wood exploitation 
industries would choose a preferences profile that gives more weight to alternative 
A1, that is, a model with fewer restrictions for them, and environmental 
organizations would prefer a preferences profile that gives more weight to A7, that 
is, a more restrictive management model. 
The alternative with the highest score would be the Borda winner. Therefore, 
alternative A2 (with most scoring) would be the most viable as per the Borda 
methodology for the park management. 
 
7. Conclusions 
 
This work has been based, first of all, on the bibliographic revision of some voting 
systems for collective decision making by identifying them, comparing them and 
classifying them by establishing a class of “Condorcet winner”, a class of “positional 
scoring procedures”, a class of “hybrid voting systems”, a class of “Score distribution 
procedure” a class of “proportional representation” and a class of “non-classified voting 
procedures” (non-ranked voting procedures). Regarding the comparison between the 
voting systems based on the Condorcet procedure, we have observed that all the 
systems are compliant with the criteria of anonymity, neutrality and homogeneity. 
Likewise, all except the Schwartz system satisfy the Pareto Condition and all comply 
with the monotony criteria except the Nanson and Dodgson voting systems. We must 
state the fact that all the voting systems comply with the criteria of the “Condorcet 
Principle” of Smith. In terms of discrimination, the Nanson, Condorcet, Black, Kemeny, 
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Dodgson and Young systems are discriminatory, while the Copeland, Fishburn and 
Schwartz are not. 
Regarding the comparison of positional voting systems, all systems comply with the 
anonymity, neutrality and monotony criteria, as well as consistency. But the only 
system resisting manipulation is Borda. 
In relation to the strengths and weaknesses of the Condorcet voting systems, we can 
highlight that a system is vulnerable in terms of the elimination and partition of 
candidates, is resistant against addition, elimination and partition of voters. It is a 
system immune to addition of candidates. While, the plural voting system is vulnerable 
to addition, elimination and partition of voters, as well as offering resistance against 
addition, elimination and partition of candidates. 
As a relevant point for voting systems, it must be said that there is no single voting 
system that is perfect, but some systems are clearly superior in comparison with the 
others in compliance of certain criteria (Brams, S.J. and Fishburn, P.C., 2002). 
In second place, in a study case, we have applied the Borda voting system to the 
Salonga National Park at the D.R. of Congo in order to choose a management model for 
the Park. This is a simulation that will allow solving some ongoing conflicts in the 
Salonga National Park since there is no plan for the use and management where the 
general guidelines for the Park had been defined. This management tool is of utmost 
relevance to foster an adequate use of the Park, speeding up citizen participation and 
ensuring sustainable exploitation. 
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